Andy Rivera Rodriguez v. Attorney General Pennsylvania by unknown
2017 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
3-28-2017 
Andy Rivera Rodriguez v. Attorney General Pennsylvania 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2017 
Recommended Citation 
"Andy Rivera Rodriguez v. Attorney General Pennsylvania" (2017). 2017 Decisions. 295. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2017/295 
This March is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2017 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
  ____________ 
 
No. 16-2510 
____________ 
 
ANDY RIVERA-RODRIGUEZ, 
     Appellant 
v. 
 
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE STATE OF PENNSYLVANIA; 
 SUPERINTENDENT GRATERFORD SCI;  
 THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY OF LANCASTER COUNTY  
____________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court  
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(E.D. Pa. No. 5-13-cv-04299) 
District Judge: Honorable James Knoll Gardner  
____________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
March 10, 2017 
 
Before: HARDIMAN and KRAUSE, Circuit Judges, and STENGEL, District Judge.* 
 
(Filed: March 28, 2017) 
____________ 
 
OPINION** 
____________ 
                                                 
* The Honorable Lawrence F. Stengel, United States District Judge for the Eastern 
District of Pennsylvania, sitting by designation. 
** This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 
does not constitute binding precedent. 
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HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge. 
 Andy Rivera-Rodriguez appeals an order of the District Court denying his petition 
for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Because Rivera-Rodriguez has 
not satisfied his onerous burden under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act 
(AEDPA), we will affirm. 
I 
 On the evening of January 17, 2004, Rivera-Rodriguez was a passenger in a 
vehicle owned by Ryan Gardina and operated by Esteban Torres-Sanchez. Police stopped 
the vehicle for driving without lights and took Torres-Sanchez into custody. Gardina was 
not in the vehicle when it was stopped and he was reported missing the next day by his 
family. The day Gardina was reported missing, a police detective went to Rivera-
Rodriguez’s home, but he wasn’t found there, so the detective left word that he would 
like to speak with Rivera-Rodriguez about Gardina’s whereabouts. Later that evening, a 
few hours after Gardina’s dead body was found near Torres-Sanchez’s home, Rivera-
Rodriguez voluntarily went to the police station. After receiving multiple Miranda 
warnings, Rivera-Rodriguez confessed to helping Torres-Sanchez murder Gardina. 
Rivera-Rodriguez was charged accordingly with, among other things, criminal homicide 
and robbery. The Commonwealth sought the death penalty.  
 Prior to the events of January 2004, Rivera-Rodriguez had a history of intellectual 
disability diagnoses. Multiple psychologists and doctors assessed him during his youth as 
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suffering from moderate mental retardation, along with other intellectual disabilities. 
Following arrests as a young man, Rivera-Rodriguez was twice committed to 
Pennsylvania Secure Treatment Units, where mental health evaluations confirmed his 
disability.  
 Aware of Rivera-Rodriguez’s disability, counsel filed a motion to suppress his 
confession alleging, inter alia, that his client’s waiver of Miranda rights could not have 
been knowing, intelligent, or voluntary. Counsel retained two experts to support his 
argument: Dr. Dixon Miller and Dr. Jerome Gottlieb. Dr. Miller testified in the 
suppression hearing as to Rivera-Rodriguez’s intellectual disabilities, including his 
evaluation that Rivera-Rodriguez had an IQ of about 58. The Commonwealth in turn 
provided testimony that: (1) Rivera-Rodriguez’s interviews with police evidenced an 
understanding of the right to remain silent, and (2) Rivera-Rodriguez’s prior encounters 
with the criminal justice system showed an ability to understand Miranda warnings 
generally. The trial court found that Rivera-Rodriguez “had sufficient mental capacity to 
understand and waive his Miranda rights” and denied the motion to suppress. App. 810–
11. 
 After the motion to suppress was denied, Rivera-Rodriguez’s counsel struck a deal 
with the Commonwealth to take the death penalty off the table in exchange for Rivera-
Rodriguez’s waiver of his right to a jury trial. The judge found Rivera-Rodriguez guilty 
and sentenced him to life in prison. The sentence was upheld on appeal.  
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 Rivera-Rodriguez sought relief under the Pennsylvania Post Conviction Relief Act 
(PCRA), 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 9543. He argued that trial counsel was ineffective for 
waiving his right to a jury trial because he was ineligible for the death penalty under 
Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002). At a hearing, Rivera-Rodriguez’s trial counsel 
testified that he was aware of both Atkins and his client’s intellectual disabilities and IQ 
tests. App. 797. But counsel also noted that Dr. Gottlieb mentioned—consistent with at 
least one other medical record—that Rivera-Rodriguez “appeared to be functioning at a 
higher IQ level than he tests.” App. 799. Additionally, counsel testified that the 
Commonwealth was prepared to submit evidence that Rivera-Rodriguez was capable of 
normal functioning, including: employment and relationship history, testimony from 
friends that he “appeared normal,” and evidence that he planned this offense and others. 
Id. In view of the “fairly nebulous definition” of adaptive functioning at the time, counsel 
decided it was uncertain whether a judge or jury would find Rivera-Rodriguez ineligible 
for the death penalty. Id. The PCRA court denied relief, and its decision was affirmed on 
appeal.  
 Rivera-Rodriguez subsequently filed an untimely federal habeas petition again 
asserting ineffective assistance of counsel.1 The District Court granted equitable tolling of 
the petition, finding that Rivera-Rodriguez’s mental disability prevented him from 
                                                 
 1 Rivera-Rodriguez asserted a number of other claims not preserved for this appeal, 
including that the trial court erred in not suppressing his confession under Miranda v. 
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
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understanding the nature of a deadline. The District Court denied his claim on the merits, 
however, holding that the state court did not err when it found that counsel was not 
deficient in bargaining, as evidence existed that Rivera-Rodriguez possessed some 
adaptive skills and the definition of “mental retardation” under Atkins was a “legal 
uncertainty.” Rivera-Rodriguez v. Superintendent Wenerowicz S.C.I. Graterford, 2016 
WL 1592949, at *3 n.3 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 21, 2016). The District Court granted a certificate 
of appealability on “his claim of ineffectiveness of counsel as to the waiver of his right to 
a jury trial.” Id. at *3. This appeal followed. 
II2 
 
 We review the District Court’s findings of fact for clear error and its conclusions 
of law de novo. Love v. Morton, 112 F.3d 131, 133 (3d Cir. 1997). Under AEDPA, we 
may reverse the state court judgment only if it “was contrary to, or involved an 
unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the 
Supreme Court of the United States” or “was based on an unreasonable determination of 
the facts in light of the evidence presented.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); see also Williams v. 
Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 384 (2000). 
                                                 
2 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241 and 2254. We have 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 2253. 
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III 
 To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, a defendant must show 
deficient performance and prejudice. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 
(1984). As to the first Strickland prong, Rivera-Rodriguez must convince us of two 
propositions. First, no reasonable factfinder could have found him death-eligible under 
Atkins. Second, counsel would have known this to be true with either a better 
understanding of the law or a more thorough investigation of Rivera-Rodriguez’s case. 
His appeal fails in both respects. 
 The Supreme Court in Atkins barred the execution of the intellectually disabled, 
but did not provide the States with a bright-line rule for determining intellectual 
disability. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 317. Rather, the Court chose to “leave to the State[s] the 
task of developing appropriate ways to enforce the constitutional restriction.” Id. 
(alteration in original) (quoting Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 416 (1986)). While the 
Court noted that those with an IQ below 70 generally suffer from what the Court 
described as “mental retardation,” id. at 308 n.3, it also noted that the clinical definition 
“require[d] not only subaverage intellectual functioning, but also significant limitations in 
adaptive skills such as communication, self-care, and self-direction,” id. at 318. As 
Rivera-Rodriguez acknowledges, Pennsylvania courts had not elaborated on the Atkins 
standard by the time of his trial. Because they had failed to do so, it was unclear whether 
Rivera-Rodriguez was eligible for the death penalty based on his IQ alone. 
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 Rivera-Rodriguez acknowledges that “IQ scores alone” would not have triggered 
Atkins protection, Rivera-Rodriguez Br. 29, but argues that greater investigation into his 
adaptive deficits would have demonstrated he was not death eligible. He places 
significant emphasis on his trial counsel’s testimony at the PCRA hearing that counsel did 
not “go into adaptive functioning with [his retained experts] to a large degree,” App. 797. 
Nevertheless, counsel remained concerned that “general facts, not necessarily expert 
opinions” would also sway the jury’s determination—namely, that the Commonwealth’s 
evidence of some adaptive skills made the Atkins determination uncertain. Id. 
 Rivera-Rodriguez’s appellate counsel diligently marshals medical and legal 
resources to show flaws in the Commonwealth’s evidence rebutting Rivera-Rodriguez’s 
intellectual disability. But whether that evidence appears persuasive today is beside the 
point for this ineffective assistance claim. Counsel for Rivera-Rodriguez knew that the 
Commonwealth would produce evidence rebutting the notion that his client was disabled 
within the meaning of Atkins and reasonably inferred there was at least a chance that the 
death penalty could be imposed. Under our deferential standard of review, we cannot say 
that the state court erred when it held that “counsel had a strategic basis for his advice.” 
App. 854.  
* * * 
 We will affirm the District Court’s judgment for the reasons stated. 
